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What Determines National Convergence of EU Law? 
Measuring the Implementation of Consumer Sales Law 
 
 
Catalina Goanta* and Mathias Siems** 
 
 
 
Abstract: Harmonisation and legal convergence are core tasks of the European Union. This 
article explores the question about the determinants for national convergence of EU law, spe-
cifically applied to the ever-growing body of European consumer sales law. The measure-
ment of national convergence is based on a unique coding of five directives in seven Member 
States. Using the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) method, the article 
finds that differences in national convergence can partly be explained by favourable features 
of the corresponding directives; however, mainly, they are the result of a combination of do-
mestic political factors and, to a lesser extent, the country characteristics. This has important 
policy implications, for instance, on the need to ‘bring in politics’ in the debate about conver-
gence, harmonisation and consumer sales law. 
Keywords: convergence, consumer sales law, fsQCA 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal convergence is in the DNA of the European Union. As a supranational construct, the 
EU aims for deep political, economical and legal integration, and legal harmonisation is the 
main tool used to this end. Harmonising national law through EU law has led to a wealth of 
rules at European level. This article focuses specifically on the impact of EU directives. Here, 
comparative legal research has shown that EU law based on directives has not led to full legal 
convergence across all Member States.1 One problem is that Member States do not always 
correctly transpose EU directives. This is monitored by the European Commission which also 
publishes an Internal Market Scoreboard on the transposition of directives.2 Correspondingly, 
researchers in political science have used inferential statistics such as regression analysis in 
order to explore the reasons for non-compliance with EU law.3  
This article aims to contribute to a multidisciplinary framework for exploring legal conver-
gence in the EU. To this end, the article suggests that the question of national legal conver-
gence is not merely a matter of the correct transposition of a directive. Gaining a more com-
plete understanding of a directive’s implementation is important given the scope of the ex-
panding number of European consumer instruments, in particular as regards further harmoni-
sation in the field of consumer law. The research underlying this article, as specifically ap-
plied to EU consumer sales law, therefore considers, for example, how specific and compre-
hensive an EU directive is and whether Member States dilute a directive’s effect through the 
use of words different from the instrument. The assessment of these factors is presented as a 
Convergence Index which has been coded across five directives and seven Member States.4  
A further innovation of this article is that it applies the method of a ‘fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis’ (fsQCA) in order to analyse the determinants for national convergence 
of EU consumer sales law. The methods of qualitative comparative analysis are frequently 
used in political science and management studies;5 yet, so far, they have only been applied to 
 
                                                 
1 Specifically for consumer law H Schulte-Nölke, C Twigg-Flesner and M Ebers (eds) EC Consumer Law Com-
pendium: The Consumer Acquis and its transposition in the Member State (Sellier European Law Publishers 
2008). For further references, for consumer law as well as other areas of law, see Section 2 (b), below. 
2 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/index_en.htm.  
3 See the references in Section 2 (c), below. 
4 See further Section 2 (a) and (b), below. 
5 See references and explanations in Section 3 (a), below. 
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few legal questions.6 In the present case, we use this approach as it can show us which logical 
combinations of conditions are likely to be the determinant ones for high or low national 
convergence. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 1 provides the theoretical back-
ground of the discussion about EU harmonisation and convergence in consumer sales law. 
Section 2 explains the underlying data on national convergence and the possible determinants 
for differences across directives and Member States, followed by the fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis in Section 3 and the conclusion. 
1. BACKGROUND: HARMONISATION AND CONVERGENCE IN CONSUMER 
SALES LAW 
The EU started regulating European consumer sales law in the 1980s to empower consumers 
in cross-border transactions.7 On the one hand, such a policy would support consumers in ex-
ercising their four freedoms (goods, services, persons and capital), as on the other hand this 
would entail a stronger internal market.8 A considerable number of regulatory instruments 
aimed at ensuring the goal of further economic integration was adopted after 1985, starting 
with the Directive 85/577/EEC on doorstep selling, and then Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair 
contract terms, Directive 97/7/EC on distance selling, Directive 1999/44/EC on consumer 
sales, and Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices. 9 
In the light of its effects on national legal systems, regulatory approximation – the policy of 
harmonisation as envisaged by the European legislator – has always been shadowed by issues 
 
                                                 
6 The path-breaking study applying fsQCA to law was TT Arvind and L Stirton, ‘Explaining the Reception of 
the Code Napoleon in Germany: A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ (2010) 30 Legal Studies 1. 
Other forms of QCA have been applied by PJ Castillo Ortiz, ‘Councils of the Judiciary and Judges’ Perceptions 
of Respect to Their Independence in Europe’ (2017) 9 Hague Journal for the Rule of Law 315; PJ Castillo Ortiz 
and I Medina, ‘Paths to the Recognition of Homo-parental Adoptive Rights in the EU-27: A QCA Analysis’ 
(2015) 22 Contemporary Politics 40; PJ Castillo Ortiz, EU Treaties and the Judicial Politics of National 
Courts: A Law and Politics Approach (Abingdon: Routledge 2016). 
7 See eg F Cafaggi, ‘The Making of European Private Law: Governance Design’, in F Cafaggi and H Muir-Watt 
(eds), Making European Private Law: Governance Design (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2008) 289; R 
Goode, ‘Contract and Commercial Law: The Logic and Limits of Harmonisation’, (2003) 7(4) Electronic Jour-
nal of Comparative Law, available at: http://www.ejcl.org/74/art74-1.html. 
8 European Commission (1985) ‘White Paper on Completing the Internal Market’, COM(85) 310. See also H-
W Micklitz, ‘European Consumer Law’ in E Jones, A Menon, and S Weatherill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 526 (move towards market-focused law). 
9 These are the Directives analysed in this article, see further Section 2 (a), below. 
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of political consensus. Two separate considerations can be highlighted on this matter: firstly, 
the scope of the relevant regulatory instruments has been at the core of political debate. The 
directives adopted on consumer contract matters have either focused on transactions of a cer-
tain nature (distance selling, doorstep selling, consumer credit, etc), or tackled specific con-
tractual topics across different types of transactions (unfair contract terms, conformity with 
the contract, etc), as opposed to offering a complete contractual regime for consumers to en-
joy throughout Europe. One such attempt was finally made when the European Commission 
designed the Common European Sales Law, but lacking the necessary political support, then 
withdrew it in 2015. From this perspective, European consumer contract law remains a so-
called ‘piecemeal’ subfield of European private law, meaning that it is regulated by a plethora 
of separate complementing instruments.10 
Secondly, Member States had to agree on the level of consumer protection awarded through 
the relevant directives. Some of them have historically enjoyed a higher standard of consumer 
protection, or already had complex legislation on relevant matters. For this reason, harmoni-
sation as a policy technique took different shapes: starting out as a form of standardisation, it 
was turned into a minimum common denominator (minimum harmonisation), while in more 
recent times the bar was raised to align all Member States to the same standard (maximum 
harmonisation).11 
The constant development of this field, as well as its intricate particularities, have made it 
transcend its origins as an appendix of the debate on the strengthening of the internal mar-
ket.12 One particular European institution contributed to this: the Court of Justice 
(ECJ/CJEU). The vast array of case law produced by the ECJ/CJEU on questions submitted 
by national courts on matters dealing with consumer contract law have offered national legal 
systems additional tools to interpret and apply consumer protection effectively.13 The Court’s 
work on Directive 93/13/EEC alone is a source of inspiration for questions relating to how 
Member States are accommodating European consumer contract law. This reflects the norma-
 
                                                 
10 C Twigg-Flesner, ‘The (Non-)impact of Harmonizing Measures on English Legal Terminology’ (2012) 20 
European Review of Private Law 1369. 
11 F Gómez-Pomar and JJ Ganuza, ‘An Economic Analysis of Harmonisation Regimes: Full Harmonisation, 
Minimum Harmonisation or Optional Instrument?’ (2011) 7 European Review of Contract Law 275. 
12 J Stuyck, ‘European Consumer Law After the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy in or Beyond the Inter-
nal Market’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 367. 
13 MJ Sørensen ‘In the Name of Effective Consumer Protection and Public Policy!’ (2016) 24 European Review 
of Private Law 791. 
5 
 
tive dimension of the standard of protection offered to consumers in the EU: unlike other le-
gal systems, the European legislator promotes a paternalistic view on consumer protection, 
expressed through a complex structure of rules aimed at removing the consumer bargaining 
handicap in B2C transactions.14 
Nevertheless, the question of whether and how harmonising consumer contracts helps the in-
ternal market is not purely normative as it needs to reflect the reality of how this policy works 
across Member States. In other words, the EU’s harmonisation strategy is supposed to have 
converging effects, which are supposed to improve the internal market. However, the details 
of the economic consequences of convergence are not fully understood, as even the task of 
comparing national transpositions in 28 Member States poses its own challenges when con-
ducted on a scale of many directives of direct and indirect importance for this field.  
The resulting complexity of European consumer sales law is an issue that can only be fully 
addressed by combining methods, tools and perspectives. One of the tools developed in this 
respect, and underlying this article, is the Convergence Index, which we define as the legally-
converging effect of harmonisation policies undertaken by the European Union in the field of 
consumer sales law.15 Applying quantitative methods in law and other social sciences is not 
straight-forward: validity and reliability of measurement needs to be ensured as many quanti-
ties are not directly observable;16 and the construction of an index needs to consider the chal-
lenges of building a composite indicator.17 At present, the Convergence Index is a metric de-
signed to measure the level of convergence stemming from the transposition of European di-
rectives into national legal systems, with a two-fold goal: (i) to show the converging effects 
of the EU harmonisation policy; and (ii) to better understand how EU law permeates national 
 
                                                 
14 O Bar-Gill and O Ben-Shahar, ‘Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Con-
sumer Contract Law (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 109. 
15 For variations of the use of the terms ‘convergence’ and ‘harmonisation’ see eg C Goanta, Convergence in 
European Consumer Sales Law (Antwerp: Intersentia 2016) 1-29; B van Leeuwen, European Standardisation of 
Services and its Impact on Private Law: Paradoxes of Convergence (Oxford: Hart 2017) 12-27. 
16 See generally S Jackman, ‘Measurement’, in JM Box-Steffenmeier, H Brady and D Collier (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Methodology (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) 119. For related questions in the 
research on ‘numerical comparative law’ and ‘leximetrics’ see eg M Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2nd edn 2018) 180-228; Z Adams, P Bastani, L Bishop and S Deakin, ‘The CBR-
LRI Dataset: Methods, Properties and Potential of Leximetric Coding of Labour Laws’ (2017) 33 International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 59.  
17 We focused on the OECD Handbook given that it is one of the few resources which can be used as a check-
list for the building of a composite indicator: OECD, Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Meth-
odology and User Guide (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/std/42495745.pdf. For a good example of a 
composite indicator see also M. Nardo et al., ‘The Consumer Empowerment Index’, JRC Scientific and Tech-
nical Reports, 2011, available at http://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. 
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legal orders in the light of subsequent patterns which can highlight the strengths and weak-
nesses of EU harmonisation. The next section explains the Convergence Index and its use in 
this article in more detail. 
2. DATA ON CONVERGENCE AND POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS 
(a) Coding national convergence 
The main aim of this article is to explain variations of national legal convergence of EU con-
sumer sales law. This is based on information from a Convergence Index which also covers 
variations of European convergence (see sub-section (b) below). The set of components of 
this index is summarised in Table 1. The study underlying this index explains the choice and 
coding of these components in detail,18 and a sample of the coding explanations is available 
online.19 In the following, we also provide an overview of the considerations behind the cod-
ing of the different components, as well as the choice of countries and directives. 
Table 1: National dimension of Convergence Index 
Indicator Assumption Coding 
National trans-
position tech-
nique 
The transposition of a directive 
through satellite laws or spe-
cialised codes leads to more 
convergence than its transposi-
tion through civil codes. 
Transposing European law in a Consumer 
Code or a satellite law (1) leads to more con-
vergence than transposing the rules in a Civil 
Code (0). 
Reception of 
selected novel 
concepts 
Incorporating European legal 
concepts into national legisla-
tion correctly leads to a higher 
level of convergence. 
If the selected novel concepts have been 
transposed correctly (1 – this also includes 
functional equivalents), this leads to more 
convergence than if they have not (0).20 
Reception of 
selected open-
ended norms 
Incorporating open-ended 
norms into national legislation 
correctly leads to a higher lev-
el of convergence. 
If the selected open-ended norms have been 
transposed correctly (1 – this also includes 
functional equivalents), this leads to more 
convergence than if they have not (0).21 
 
                                                 
18 Goanta, above n 15, 164-175.  
19 See http://www.mepli.eu/convergence-in-european-sales-law/. 
20 This factor sometimes requires normalisation, depending on the number of novel concepts selected. It is done 
by creating an average which then becomes the maximum value allotted to one individual such concept (eg if 
two concepts are identified, the maximum value given to each if the concept has been transposed correctly is 
0.5). 
21 The same normalisation approach as with the previous factor was applied. 
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Reference to 
European law in 
end legislation 
Reference to the European in-
strument made in transposing 
legislation leads to more con-
vergence. 
If there is a reference to the transposed Di-
rective in transposing legislation (1), it leads 
to more convergence than if there is none (0). 
Timely transpo-
sition (date of 
national legisla-
tion) 
Transposing a directive within 
the time frame established by 
the European legislator leads 
to more convergence. 
If Member States transpose European law 
timely (1), it leads to more convergence than 
if they do not (0). 
Infringement 
procedures 
Transposing a directive cor-
rectly leads to more conver-
gence. 
If a Member State has had no infringement 
procedures initiated against it (1), this entails 
more convergence than if infringement proce-
dures have been brought against a State (0). 
 
The first component, national transposition technique, entails that if a national legislator 
chooses to transpose European legislation through a code or satellite law, the rules are likely 
to reflect a harmonised European identity. However, if European consumer rules are accom-
modated in a civil code, they will very likely have to fit into the existing national private law 
framework and thus the converging effect might be weaker. For example, if a national legis-
lator must amend a civil code to accommodate European legislation, it will adapt the latter to 
the terminology used by established codification, and thus the European identity of the rules 
will be diluted.  
The second component, reception of selected novel concepts, stands for the identity and in-
terpretation of selected substantive provisions that are new to a national legal order. As Euro-
pean terminology lies at the core of the harmonisation debate, novel concepts are defined 
here as European legal concepts giving rise to legal rights or obligations, independent from 
any similar rights or obligations that might exist at national level. An example is the way 
some EU directives include the right of consumers to withdraw from a contract in a ‘cooling-
off period’: here, while Member States may achieve the same effect through other legal con-
cepts, such as termination of the contract, this leads to less convergence than the precise use 
of the novel European concept.22 
Similarly, the third component, reception of selected open-ended norms, focuses on the way 
in which national legal systems accommodate blanket clauses. Open-ended norms are behav-
ioural and moral standards that parties are held to respect in a contractual relationship, de-
 
                                                 
22 Thus, a change in terminology matters as it leads to divergent practical applications of the law and contradicts 
the existence of the EU as a sui generis juridical order shaped by a common identity: eg, Directive 85/577/EEC 
includes the right of consumers to withdraw from the contract; yet, when Romania and France chose to trans-
pose this concept through that of ‘termination’, the legal nature of this right was transformed. 
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pending on their specific circumstances. This factor is partially connected to terminology that 
comes with a separate content from whatever equivalents might exist in the national legal or-
der, which should ideally be treated independently. A good illustration of this problem is the 
concept of good faith.23 The Unfair Contract Terms Directive uses this concept in its general 
test, and the danger of not acknowledging the European roots of good faith in the context of 
unfair terms leads to the application of the national equivalent. The ideal interpretation of 
good faith in European context is shown by Justice Mann in Foxtons, when citing the Pream-
ble of the Directive for a better understanding of what its definition: ‘That recital brings in the 
concept of good faith. This is an autonomous Community expression and has been elaborated 
in English authority as will in due course appear’.24 
The fourth component, reference to European law in end legislation, deals with the way a 
national legal instrument can signal its European source in order to guide practitioners into 
applying it as such, and not solely as a national set of rules. Being aware that specific con-
sumer sales rules stem from the European legislator facilitates the interpretation as a source 
of European law (which is required for EU hard law, such as directives), instead of mistaking 
this identity for a national framework.25  
Timely transposition, the fifth national component, is relevant since any delay hinders effec-
tive harmonisation. Failure to implement a directive by a specified date leads to national 
courts having to interpret national law in the light of the purpose of the directive, as mandated 
by direct effect. However, sometimes it might prove difficult for national courts to do just 
that. Although untimely transposition may also be the subject of infringement procedures, 
often such applications become obsolete because Member States have, in the meantime, en-
acted transposing legislation. In order to avoid the bias of overlooking these cases, this com-
ponent focusses on the initial failure of a timely transposition. 
Sixth, the component on infringement procedures covers Member State behaviour when as-
sessing willingness to engage in harmonisation efforts. Infringement procedures may be taken 
against a Member State pursuant to Article 258 TFEU for the failure to fulfil an obligation 
 
                                                 
23 S Bright, ‘Winning the Battle against Unfair Contract Terms’ (2000) 20 Legal Studies 331. 
24 The Office of Fair Trading v Foxtons Limited [2009] EWHC 1681 (Ch), para. 18. 
25 European instruments have long been drafted with the requirement that the transposing legislation must make 
reference to the specific implemented Directive, see for instance Art. 10(2) of the Directive 93/13/EEC or Art. 
19 of the Directive 2005/29/EC; however, when transposing European instruments through Civil Code provi-
sions, this reference cannot be inferred.  
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under the Treaties, be it regarding the untimely adoption of implementing measures, or issues 
regarding the conformity and correct application of these measures. However, this last factor 
only takes into account resilience to harmonisation, manifested in the incorrect transposition 
of European law. In order to avoid any overlap with timely transposition, this component 
therefore only considers those infringement procedures resulting in CJEU decisions on incor-
rect transposition. 
In the study underlying this section, the values of these six national convergence components 
were coded for five directives (Doorstep Selling, Unfair Contract Terms, Distance Selling, 
Consumer Sales and Unfair Commercial Practices)26 and seven Member States (Belgium, 
France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Romania and the United Kingdom).27 Several 
reasons account for this selection. First, it focuses on key consumer sales directives from the 
consumer acquis that address substantive issues of sales law and apply a general level of con-
sumer protection, while other directives either deal with specific procedural aspects or indus-
tries28 or were too recent for the Index to be relevant.29 Second, as regards the countries, the 
selection includes both the civil and common law countries, as well as newer and older 
Member States.30 In addition, the targeted analysis of a limited number of units is deliberate 
in this article given the use of fsQCA as an extension of a case-based method of social sci-
ence research.31 
 
                                                 
26 Directive 85/577/EEC; Directive 93/13/EEC; Directive 97/7/EC; Directive 99/44/EC; Directive 2005/29/EC. 
27 Note that the question about the UK’s departure from the EU is not relevant here as we examine a period well 
in advance of the Brexit referendum on 2016. 
28 Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services; Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information so-
ciety services; Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer credit. 
29 Eg Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights (which also amended and repealed some of the prior directives). 
30 The underlying study builds on the selection of directives and countries, see Goanta, above n 15. 
31 See Section 3, below. 
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Table 2: National convergence across five Directives and seven Member States (max. 6) 
Countries Doorstep Selling 
Unfair Con-
tract Terms 
Distance 
Selling 
Consumer 
Sales 
Unfair Commer-
cial Practices 
Belgium 3.5 4.5 4.5 2 2.8 
France 3.5 3.75 3 2.33 3.6 
Germany 4.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 4 
Ireland 4.5 6 5 5 5.6 
Netherlands 2.5 0.25 2.5 2.91 2.3 
Romania 4.5 5 3.5 6 3.8 
UK 3.5 5 5 3.75 5 
The resulting aggregate values on national convergence are displayed in Table 2. We use 
these aggregates, rather than the individual values, as our main point of interest because they 
provide good variation across the 35 observations. It is also in line with research that express-
es a preference for composites or ‘bundles’ of variables in order to capture substitutes and 
complements of individual variables,32 as well as the more general literature on index con-
struction which accepts the usefulness of composite indicators.33  
(b) Coding European convergence  
This article explores the determinants of these aggregate values of national convergence. An 
initial point to consider is the role of the EU in stimulating convergence. This EU dimension 
of the convergence debate can draw on an extensive literature in general European private 
law34 and further afield.35 Specifically, the following has to consider that the five directives 
may have different predispositions to stimulate national convergence. Here, we use the Euro-
pean dimension of the Convergence Index. It consists of the components of Table 3. Again, 
 
                                                 
32 See eg R García-Castro, RV Aguilera, and MA Ariño, ‘Bundles of Firm Corporate Governance Practices: A 
Fuzzy Set Analysis’ (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review 390; G Schnyder, ‘Measuring 
Corporate Governance: Lessons From the ‘Bundles Approach’, CBR Working Paper No. 438/2012, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220616. 
33 Eg OECD, above n 17. 
34 Eg, P Legrand, ‘Public Law, Europeanisation and Convergence: Can Comparatists Contribute?’, in P Beau-
mont et al (eds), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Oxford: Hart 2002) 225; C Joerges, 
‘The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation Process and as a Contest of Disciplines – An Analysis 
of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law 175; M 
Hesselink, The New European Legal Culture (The Hague: Kluwer International 2002).  
35 For changes to the EU’s economic policy see eg, N Jabko, Playing the Market A Political Strategy for Uniting 
Europe, 1985–2005 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2006). For two specific areas of law see eg B Dun-
can, ‘Health Policy in the European Union: How it’s Made and How to Influence it’ (2002) 324 British Medical 
Journal 1027; R Eising and N Jabko, ‘Moving Targets: Institutional Embeddedness and Domestic Politics in the 
Liberalization of EU Electricity Markets’ (2001) 34 Comparative Political Studies 742. 
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the study underlying this index explains the choice and coding of these components in de-
tail;36 thus, here, we just provide a summary. 
Table 3: European dimension of Convergence Index 
Indicator Assumption Coding 
Law v policy Mandatory law leads to a higher level 
of harmonisation than policy. 
Law (1) leads to more convergence than 
policy (0). 
Type of Eu-
ropean in-
strument 
Some EU instruments envisioned by 
Article 288 TFEU lead to a higher 
level of harmonisation than others 
Regulations (1) lead to more convergence 
than directives (0). 
Nature of 
policy 
Maximum harmonisation leads to 
more harmonisation than minimum 
harmonisation. 
Maximum harmonisation (1) leads to 
more convergence than minimum harmo-
nisation (0). 
Reference to 
self-
regulation 
Explicit reference to forms of self-
regulation in the Directive (eg codes 
of conduct) leads to more harmonisa-
tion. 
If reference to self-regulation is made in 
an instrument (1), it leads to more con-
vergence than if no such reference in 
made (0). 
General 
clause 
Instruments establishing general 
clauses lead to less harmonisation 
than those not using such clauses. 
If an instrument does not contain a gen-
eral clause (1), it leads to more conver-
gence than if it does (0).  
Black list Instruments that annex a black list of 
practices lead to more convergence. 
If an instrument contains a black list (1), 
it leads to more convergence than if it 
does not (0). 
CJEU case 
law 
Interpretation and application of Di-
rective previously unclear. 
Low number of preliminary references for 
Doorstep Selling, Distance Selling and 
Consumer Sales Directives (1); high 
number for Unfair Commercial Practices 
and Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
(0).37 
 
The first component in the European set, law v policy, reflects the nature of the European in-
strument: mandatory or voluntary. It can be argued that if an instrument is mandatory (eg, it 
is a directive), the national transposition efforts reflect top-down harmonisation, and that is 
more far-reaching than informal coordination policies. Even if the latter may prove success-
ful, legal norms theoretically have a higher converging effect than political norms, because of 
– among other reasons – their enforceable nature. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that not 
 
                                                 
36 Goanta, above n 15. 
37 The cut-off between law/high was set at ‘10’ (information coded up to October 2016). 
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only this component, but all the components below are assumed to be indicators of legal con-
vergence, and not (mere) policy convergence.38 
The second component, type of European instrument, focuses on the types of legislative acts. 
In the field of consumer sales law, directives are the main legislative acts (eg, Unfair Contract 
Terms, Unfair Commercial Practices, etc). In more recent years, the proposal for a Common 
European Sales Law (CESL) has paved the way to regulation-based harmonisation; however, 
the CESL has been withdrawn by the Commission, which in turn presented three new direc-
tives on related matters.39 The main difference between CESL and the existing (and pro-
posed) directives is that the CESL had been shaped into a regulation, which would have been 
applicable as such (even as an optional instrument), whereas directives still need to be trans-
posed in national legislation. 
The third component, nature of policy, looks into the degree of harmonisation. While in its 
earlier days, consumer contracts were governed by minimum harmonisation, the trend in 
more recent times has been that of maximum harmonisation. This shift affects the way in 
which national jurisdictions accommodate European law. Moreover, it can be said that by not 
allowing Member States to derogate from common standards, national regimes become more 
similar.40  
The fourth component, reference to self-regulation, assesses any self-regulation references in 
a directive, as well as the extent to which it is promoted by that directive. Private law actors 
complement state-made law with their own standards (eg trustmarks, codes of conduct, etc). 
Acknowledging the activity of the private sector may lead to the creation of public-private 
structures that can check this activity and make sure it does not fall short of the European 
standards it is supposed to fulfil.41  
 
                                                 
38 For the latter see eg L Tholoniat, ‘The Career of the Open Method of Coordination: Lessons from a ‘Soft’ EU 
Instrument’ (2010) 33 West European Politics 93. 
39 European Parliament, Legislative Train Schedule (Common European Sales Law), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-connected-digital-single-market/file-common-european-
sales-law. See also C Twigg-Flesner, ‘Good-Bye Harmonisation by Directives, Hello Cross-Border only Regu-
lation? – A way forward for EU Consumer Contract Law’ (2011) 7 European Review of Contract Law 235. 
40 F Cafaggi and A Nicita, ‘The Evolution of Consumer Protection in the EU’, in T Eger and H-B Schäfer (eds), 
Research Handbook on the Economics of European Union Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2012) 263. 
41 See eg A Beckers, ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct and Contract Law: A Doctrinal and Normative Perspective’, 
in R Brownsword et al (eds), Research Handbook on Contract and Regulation 89 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
2017); F Cafaggi, ‘Self-Regulation in European Contract Law’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 163; 
J Thøgersen et al., ‘Consumer Responses to Ecolabels’ (2010) 44 European Journal of Marketing 1787. 
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The fifth component, general clause, deals with standard tests imposed by the law. A general 
clause is a provision in the text of the directive that uses a statutory test to determine whether 
the professional in a B2C transaction has fulfilled a specific legal standard. The general test 
normally includes several generic conditions, designed in a way that can include different 
factual patterns applicable to consumer contracts.42  
The sixth component, black list, reflects the listing of specific factual situations which must 
be interpreted in the same manner throughout all Member States when it comes to specific 
consumer transactions. It can be argued that if the European legislator sets out examples of 
practices which national courts are required to follow, then it is more likely that legal systems 
converge more, since such a list has a unifying role in relation to practice. This is the example 
of the black list found in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Not the same can be 
said about all such lists: while black lists have the unifying effect mentioned before, grey lists 
only include examples of practices that must still be tested against circumstantial facts.43 
The seventh component, CJEU case law, reflects the usefulness of patterns that can be found 
in the volume of case law decided on by the ECJ/CJEU.44 The assumption here is that an un-
clear directive will lead to more cases as national courts struggle with the interpretation and 
application of European law. While the subsequent European case law may then foster Euro-
pean convergence, it does not change the fact that the original directive was drafted in a way 
necessitating judicial clarifications.45 This view is supported by the nature of the CJEU’s ac-
 
                                                 
42 H Beale, ‘General Clauses and Specific Rules in the Principles of European Contract Law: The Good Faith 
Clause’, in S Grundmann and D Mazeaud (eds), General Clauses and Standards in European Contract Law 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2006) 205; G Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or 
How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11; T Wilhelmsson, ‘The 
Abuse of the ‘Confident Consumer’ as a Justification for EC Consumer Law’ (2004) 27 Journal of Consumer 
Policy 317. 
43 R Mańko, Unfair Contract Terms in EU law, ‘Unfair Terms Directive and Common European Sales Law’, EU 
Parliament Library Briefing, 19 September 2013; C Willett, ‘General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of Eu-
ropean Consumer Law in the UK’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 412; J Stuyck et al, ‘Confidence through 
Fairness? The New Directive on Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market’ 
(2006) Common Market Law Review 107. 
44 See eg S Weatherill, ‘Interpretation of the Directives: The Role of the Court’, in A Hartkamp et al (eds), To-
wards a European Civil Code 181 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2011); S Weatherill, ‘The Limits of 
Legislative Harmonisation Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s Case Law has become a 
“Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827; G Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of 
the EU (Oxford: Hart 2013). 
45 For further explanation, see Goanta, above n 15, at 171: ‘In recent years, especially when dealing with the 
UCPD, the Court started issuing orders instead of judgments. These orders are procedurally justified using Arti-
cle 99 of the Rules of the Court. The fact that the Court still issues reasoned opinions in spite of the high load of 
existing case law can be interpreted to mean that national courts simply do not understand how to apply trans-
posing legislation […] It thus follows that the Romanian, Spanish, Hungarian and Slovak courts behind these 
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tivity: in the past years, the Court issued orders instead of judgments for various cases com-
ing specifically from Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. Procedurally, the 
Court may choose to do so for questions on matters that have already been decided. Based on 
the fact that national courts can consult this case law, and still take the liberty to ask questions 
through the preliminary reference procedure, it is therefore argued that the provisions needing 
interpretation are so complex that national courts still do not know how to relate to them. 
Coding the five directives of consumer law, we find that they have different predispositions 
to stimulate national convergence. Aggregates of the seven components of Table 3 lead to the 
score of ‘1’ for the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, ‘3’ for the Doorstep Selling, Distance 
Selling and Consumer and Consumer Sales Directives, and ‘4’ for the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive.46 We also considered using other conditions, for example, the length of 
the directives and their transposition periods.47 Yet, as this information would be identical for 
all of the countries under consideration, there is no benefit of including more conditions on 
the respective directives. Potentially interesting would be to code whether some of the Mem-
ber States opposed a directive in the Council. However, as also noted in the literature,48 such 
information has only been made available recently; in particular, it is impossible to gather 
such information for the 1980s and 1990s:49 thus, it could not be considered in the analysis of 
this article.  
(c) Possible further determinants for national convergence 
In addition to the European dimension of the convergence index, this article examines which 
other factors influence legal convergence in consumer sales law. This can draw on a rich lit-
erature from legal research on private law harmonisation, as well as other fields and topics of 
                                                                                                                                                        
specific preliminary references have asked questions that the Court had addressed before. This stands to show 
that even in spite of the growing body of case law on the UCPD, national courts continue to look at the Court of 
Justice for interpreting Article 3 of the directive and its interaction with national provisions.’ 
46 For details see Goanta, above n 15. 
47 As done in A Zhelyazkova, ‘Complying with EU Directives’ Requirements: The Link Between EU Decision-
Making and the Correct Transposition of EU Provisions’ (2013) 20 Journal of European Public Policy 702. 
48 MZ Hillebrandt, D Curtin and A Meijer, ‘Transparency in the EU Council of Ministers: An Institutional 
Analysis’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 1. 
49 For recent data see www.votewatch.eu/en/term8-council-latest-votes.html, http://api.epdb.eu/#data and 
www.elprg.eu/data.htm. 
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European research.50 For present purposes, first, we identified conditions that aim to com-
plement the national factors of the Convergence Index, given that such national characteris-
tics of the legal system can help to clarify the role of the national legislator in legal conver-
gence. Second, we considered the political dimension of the transposition debate with the aim 
of testing the Convergence Index on conditions that deal with national politics.  
Thus, based on our reading of the literature, we identify six further conditions that can be di-
vided into two groups of three conditions dealing with ‘country characteristics’ on the one 
hand and ‘national politics’ on the other. The selection of the conditions also considered that, 
for all of them, we expect only a unidirectional causal relationship for national-level conver-
gence; thus, we do not face issues of endogeneity which have been a source of concern for 
some of the previous empirical research on the relationship between law and society (includ-
ing political and economic factors).51  
Table 4: Possible determinants for national convergence 
 
Conditions Data sources Time 
EU convergence: 
Propensity of di-
rective to stimulate 
convergence 
Own calculations based on Convergence Index (see (b) 
above) 
n.a. 
Country characteristics: 
No existing legisla-
tion on matter of 
directive  
Own calculations: coded as ‘1’, ‘0’ and ‘0.5’ (if there was 
partial legislation) 
EU year 
adoption 
Good legal system Legal system and property rights, as available at 
www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/  
Middle  
value52 
 
                                                 
50 The non-empirical literature on legal convergence already touches upon additional factors arising out of the 
supra-national policy-making nature of the European Union. See eg D Caruso, ‘The Missing View of the Cathe-
dral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 3; C Joerges, 
‘Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration’ 
(1996) 2 European Law Journal 105; T Wilhelmsson, ‘The Legal, the Cultural and the Political – Conclusions 
from Different Perspectives on Harmonisation of European Contract Law’ (2002) 13 European Business Law 
Review 541. For the political science literature see Zhelyazkova, above n 47, as well as the further references in 
the present section.  
51 See the discussion in M Siems and S Deakin, ‘Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present and Future Re-
search’ (2010) 166 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 120. 
52 This refers to the middle value of the data (i) for EU year adoption and (ii) national enactment. However, for 
Romania we only considered the national implementation year.  
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Public support for 
EU 
 
Data for question ‘people who said that EU Membership is a 
good thing’, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.c
fm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/3/groupKy/3 
Middle  
value53 
National politics: 
Effective govern-
ment 
Based on information available at www.parlgov.org/, with 
average score of: (i) political diversity of the government, ie 
whether government consists of one or multiple parties (and 
in the latter case considering the distance of the parties which 
are most left and right-wing), and (ii) voting power of the par-
ties of government in parliament. For France this condition 
treats the two cases of ‘cohabitation’ (government and presi-
dent belonging to different parties) as akin to a coalition.  
National en-
actment 
Left-wing govern-
ment 
Data available at www.parlgov.org/ (also considering coali-
tion governments and ‘cohabitation’ as in previous condition)  
National en-
actment 
No interruption by 
elections 
Period between EU adoption and national enactment not inter-
rupted by elections  
 (see left) 
 
The summary of the corresponding six conditions in Table 4 indicates that we have used dif-
ferent moments in time for different conditions. This is due to the fact that we expect some 
conditions to be relevant for the substantive orientation of the directive (eg, whether a gov-
ernment is left or right-wing) and therefore consider the moment of the national enactment. In 
other instances, our expectation is that the entire period from EU adoption to national enact-
ment has shaped the domestic process of implementation (eg, the public support for the EU). 
The three conditions on ‘country characteristics’ consider, first, whether there is no existing 
legislation in the matter of the respective directive.54 The rationale is that existing legislation 
creates path-dependence and therefore, potentially, less legal convergence for the Member 
State in question. Second, we include a condition on the quality of the legal system. The ra-
tionale is that it can be expected that in countries with good protection of rights in general, 
there is also the motivation to provide high levels of consumer protection. Similar conditions 
have been used in related studies, for example, Börzel and colleagues consider bureaucratic 
quality and rule of law.55 Specifically, our choice for the data on ‘Legal system and property 
rights’ by the Fraser Institute is due to the fact that it provides information for the 1980s and 
 
                                                 
53 For Romania information is only reported from 2007: thus, here, this year has also been used for the prior 
implementations. 
54 Based on the information of Schulte-Nölke et al, above n 1. 
55 T Börzel, T Hofmann, D Panke, and C Sprungk, ‘Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not 
Comply With European Law’ (2010) 43 Comparative Political Studies 1363.  
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1990s,56 while most of the other datasets (eg, the various corruption indicators) only start in 
the late 1990s. The third condition support for the EU is also commonly used in studies that 
evaluate the non-compliance with EU law.57 It may be relevant here since the law-making 
institutions of a country can reflect the view of the population as regards either more com-
plete or more limited legal convergence. 
Further conditions related to ‘country characteristics’ were considered in our preliminary as-
sessment but eventually not included in the final analysis,58 such as the divide between civil 
and common law countries or differences based on cultural variables (eg, the Hofstede da-
ta59). The two common law countries of our study tend to show slightly higher scores for na-
tional convergence.60 In terms of culture, it may be hypothesised that aspects such as individ-
ualism or uncertainty avoidance61 could reflect a country’s approach to consumer protection. 
However, the problem is that these conditions would not vary across time. Thus, the validity 
of any results based on the current dataset would be too slim.62 
The group of conditions dealing with ‘national politics’ also consists of three potential condi-
tions. First, the condition on the effectiveness of the government examines whether a powerful 
government can more easily enact laws, leading to full convergence – or, in other words, 
whether the need to make compromises leads to less convergence. This condition is related to 
conditions used in the literature, for instance, on the number of veto players and constraints 
of government branches.63 In this article we consider the political diversity of the govern-
ment, the voting power of the parties of government in parliament and the specific case of the 
French ‘cohabitation’. Second, as far as national politics is concerned, it can be hypothesised 
that left-wing governments are more willing to support consumer protection and therefore al-
 
                                                 
56 Up to the year 2000, however, it only coded in a five-year interval (ie 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000): thus, 
here, we extrapolated the intermediate scores for the other years. 
57 Eg, Börzel et al, above n 55. 
58 For the inherent limitations of the choice of conditions see also the Conclusion, below.  
59 See https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html. 
60 Aggregating the data for all directives, the ranking of the seven countries is: (1) Ireland (26.1); (2) Romania 
(22.8); (3) UK (22.25); (4) Germany (19); (5) Belgium (17.3); (6) France (16.18); (7) The Netherlands (10.46). 
61 As in the Hostede data, see above n 59. 
62 Other factors might influence convergence by proxy, such as: consumer rights awareness; consumer prefer-
ences; the number of cases per judge; judicial training; or the number of lawyers specialised in European law in 
relation to the total number of lawyers, etc. While relevant for convergence in general, such data is not consist-
ently available and would pose further issues for the accuracy of the results.  
63 M Kaeding, ‘Necessary Conditions for the Effective Transposition of EU Legislation’ (2008) 36 Policy & 
Politics 261; Börzel et al, above n 55. 
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so more willing to implement measures leading to full national convergence (noting that four 
out of five directives of this article are based on the concept of minimum harmonisation). It 
may also be argued that this factor can capture that right-wing governments can be national-
istic and Eurosceptic. Thus, in this regard, this condition supplements the coding of the EU 
support of the general population. Third, if the implementation period is interrupted, conver-
gence may be incomplete or delayed. Such a condition is used in related studies.64 It also fills 
a gap left by the condition ‘effective government’ which only considers the situation at the 
moment of the national enactment; thus, the information about the interruption of the imple-
mentation period can be relevant as it captures the potential influence of the previous gov-
ernment. 
3. FUZZY-SET QCA OF CONVERGENCE AND LACK OF CONVERGENCE 
(a) FsQCA in a nutshell 
This article applies the method of a ‘fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ (fsQCA) in 
order to analyse the determinants for national convergence of EU consumer sales law. 
FsQCA has become a popular method across many academic disciplines. For example, in po-
litical science and European studies, it has been applied to the transposition of EU legisla-
tion65 and the ‘gold-plating’ of European directives.66 There are also examples from legal 
scholarship67 and management studies68 which have used FsQCA in order to understand legal 
and regulatory differences between countries. 
 
                                                 
64 Eg, D Finke and T Dannwolf ‘Who Let the Dogs Out? The Effect of Parliamentary Scrutiny on Compliance 
with EU law’ (2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy 1127 at 1136 (for legislative discontinuity); 
Kaeding, above n 63, at 266 (for year of election cycle). 
65 M Kaeding, Better Regulation in the European Union: Lost in Translation or Full Steam Ahead? The Trans-
position of EU Transport Directives Across Member States (Leiden: Leiden University Press 2007), as well as 
Kaeding, above n 63. 
66 E Thomann, ‘Customizing Europe: Transposition as Bottom-Up Implementation’ (2015) 22 Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy 1368. 
67 See the references above n 6. 
68 Eg, VF Misangyi, T Greckhamer, S Furnari, PC Fiss, D Crilly and R Aguilera ‘Embracing Causal Complexi-
ty: The Emergence of a Neo-Configurational Perspective’ (2017) 47 Journal of Management 255; I Haxhi and 
RV Aguilera, ‘An Institutional Configurational Approach to Cross-National Diversity in Corporate Governance’ 
(2017) 54 Journal of Management Studies 261; MA Witt and G Jackson, ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Institu-
tional Comparative Advantage: A Test and Reinterpretation’ (2016) 47 Journal of International Business Stud-
ies 778. 
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FsQCA differs from regression analysis as it does not require a large number of observations 
and a small number of explanatory variables, ie it can work with a small number of observa-
tions and a relatively large number of explanatory factors (in the fsQCA terminology: ‘condi-
tions’). More specifically, it aims to ‘facilitate a dialogue between theory and evidence’;69 
thus, it also asks researchers to use qualitative skills and knowledge in research design and 
evaluation. In the present case, fsQCA in combination with configurational narratives can 
indicate variants of causal relationships for the specific countries and directives under inves-
tigation (as the following will show). This also means that this approach can achieve a rela-
tively high level of internal validity (though with a lower level of external validity than stud-
ies of ‘large n’ regression analysis). 
The use of fsQCA is an extension of ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ (QCA). Charles 
Ragin, the founding father of QCA, summarises QCA as follows:70 it is an ‘analytic tech-
nique that uses Boolean algebra to implement principles of comparison used by scholars en-
gaged in the qualitative study of macro social phenomena’. Its aim is that, ‘by formalizing the 
logic of qualitative analysis, QCA makes it possible to bring the logic and empirical intensity 
of qualitative approaches to studies that embrace more than a handful of cases – research sit-
uations that normally call for the use of variable-oriented, quantitative methods’. The ultimate 
goal of this exercise is to show ‘the different combinations of conditions that produce a spe-
cific outcome.’ 
Conventional ‘crisp-set’ QCA codes the conditions in a binary way (‘0 and ‘1). The ‘fuzzy-
set’ in fsQCA means that the analysis allows intermediate numbers that range from ‘0’ to ‘1’. 
Thus, this approach opens this line of research to types of data as collected in the current arti-
cle as all but one of the conditions are of a non-binary nature.71 We therefore normalised the 
data of all possible conditions to the scale of ‘0’ to ‘1’, ie the lowest value was set as ‘0’, the 
 
                                                 
69 A Marx, B Rihoux and C Ragin, ‘The Origins, Development, and Application of Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis: The First 25 Years’ (2014) 6 European Political Science Review 115. Closer interaction between theo-
ry and data is also advocated for more conventional empirical approaches, see eg G Schnyder, M Siems and RV 
Aguilera, ‘Twenty Years of “Law and Finance”: Time to Take Law Seriously’ Socio-Economic Review, early 
view at https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwy041; CH Achen, ‘Toward a New Political Methodology: Microfounda-
tions and ART’ (2002) 5 Annual Review of Political Science 423. 
70 For all of the following quotes: www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/index.shtml.  
71 See Section 2, above (the exception is ‘no interruption by elections’). 
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highest as ‘1’ and the others were scaled accordingly in a continuous way, rounded to two 
decimal places.72 Subsequently, the dataset was imported into the main software for fsQCA.73 
(b) Methodological choices 
The main outcome analysed in the following is the level of national convergence.74 In addi-
tion, it is possible to set the outcome as ‘negated’.75 This means that, in the present case, we 
also examined what factors account for particularly low levels of convergence. The possible 
causal conditions are the seven conditions discussed in the previous section.  
In contrast to regression analysis, fsQCA requires a more active position of the researcher in 
the analysis,76 as will be shown in the following. First, the fsQCA program presents the result 
in a ‘truth table’ which shows the different combinations of the causal conditions with the 
corresponding consistency thresholds.77 The default consistency threshold is 0.8, and for a 
small number of observations and few outcomes with more than one case (as here), it is rec-
ommended to choose a threshold of ‘1’.78 We have no reason to deviate from this recommen-
dation in the present case, but also checked alternative specifications and the results remain 
unchanged. 
Second, the next decision to take is whether researchers expect the causal conditions to be 
‘present’, ‘absent’, or either ‘present or absent’, to be precise their information helps the 
software to distinguish ‘easy’ from ‘difficult’ counterfactuals during logical minimisation. In 
 
                                                 
72 Other studies (eg Arvind and Stirton, above n 6) code the data in a way that only specific intermediate scores 
are allowed (eg, 0.5, or 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75). We also checked whether such an approach would make a differ-
ence; yet, our results remain unchanged; see also CQ Schneider and C Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for 
the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2012) 38 (choice of strategy makes little difference for results). The Appendix 1 of this article displays the de-
scriptive statistics of this dataset as well as a table of correlations of the conditions. 
73 C Ragin and S Davey, fs/QCA, version 3.0, available at www.compasss.org/software.htm. 
74 See Section 2 (a), above. 
75 As also done, eg, by Haxhi and Aguilera, above n 68; Arvind and Stirton, above n 6. 
76 Of course, the former also has degrees of subjectivity, as explicitly accepted in Bayesian statistics but also 
inevitable elsewhere; cf eg N Fenton, M Neil, and D Berger, ‘Bayes and the Law’ (2016) 3 Annual Review of 
Statistics and Its Application 51, 70 (‘…there is the major challenge of getting legal professionals to accept the 
validity of subjective probabilities that are an inevitable part of Bayes. Yet, ultimately, any use of probability – 
even if it is based on frequentist statistics – relies on a range of subjective assumptions’). See also the compari-
son of the assumptions in QCA and regression analysis in J Seawright, ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis vis-à-
vis Regression’ (2005) 40 Studies in Comparative International Development 3. 
77 See Appendix 2, below. 
78 See C Ragin, User’s Guide to Fuzzy-Set / Qualitative Comparative Analysis (University of Arizona 2008) 46, 
also available at www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/download/fsQCAManual.pdf. 
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the dataset of this article, the explanatory factors were defined in a way that we expect a posi-
tive effect for a high level of national convergence (and vice versa for a low level of national 
convergence). Sometimes the fsQCA program also presents the researcher with a ‘prime im-
plication chart’ indicating model ambiguities. In the present case, any such ambiguities can 
also be resolved by way of expressing a preference for a positive effect for a high level of na-
tional convergence (and vice versa for a low level of national convergence). 
Third, the fsQCA results are then presented as ‘complex’, ‘parsimonious’ and ‘intermediate’ 
solutions. These three solutions indicate a trade-off between coverage and consistency (ie 
breadth and accuracy of the solutions).79 The complex solution has the highest consistency 
but the lowest coverage, while it is the opposite for the parsimonious solution. Some of the 
literature, discussing fsQCA results, presents all three solutions,80 but more commonly re-
searchers are selective in the way they report the solutions – ie, whether to focus on the com-
plex, parsimonious or intermediate solution, or combinations of those.81 In the present case, 
we discuss the parsimonious and intermediate solutions as the complex solution did not re-
duce the data to an extent that it would facilitate to the interpretation of the configurational 
outcomes.  
With these methodological explanations and choices, we can now turn to the results. 
(c) Result and discussion for high national convergence 
Table 5 presents the results for the main question of interest of this article: what determines 
high levels of national convergence for the observations of this study? The solution coverage 
and solution consistency of the intermediate solution have high numbers (above 0.8). As one 
would expect, the parsimonious solution has lower overall consistency but higher overall 
coverage. The main focus of the following analysis will be the intermediate solution with 
some references to the parsimonious one. 
 
 
                                                 
79 For more technical definitions see Ragin, above n 78, at 85 (‘coverage measures how much of the outcome is 
covered (or explained) by each solution term and by the solution as a whole’; ‘consistency measures the degree 
to which solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome’). 
80 Eg, Arvind and Stirton, above n 6. 
81 Eg, Witt and Jackson, above n 68; García-Castro et al, above n 32. 
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Table 5: Determinants for high national convergence (‘intermediate solution’ with results 
also in ‘parsimonious solution’ in large signs) 82 
Pathways
1 2 3 4 5 6
EU convergence
Country characteristics
No existing legislation
Good legal system
Public support for EU
National politics
Effective government
Left-wing government
No interruption by elections
Consistency 0.84 0.88 0.95 0.96 0.92 1.00
Raw Coverage 0.56 0.60 0.53 0.31 0.32 0.21
Unique Coverage 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.00
Cases with >0.5 membership 17 10 7 7 5 1
Overall Solution Consistency  0.84 (intermediate), 0.71 (parsimonious)
Overall Solution Coverage  0.93 (intermediate), 0.98 (parsimonious)  
Different from the output of a regression analysis, Table 5 does not contain different models 
but different pathways. Thus, fsQCA considers that different combinations can lead to the 
same outcome of interest (in the present case: high convergence).83 We also established that 
none of the conditions is alone necessary for the outcome.84 In the comparison of the different 
pathways, it can be seen that all of the paths have high consistency and that there is a trade-
off with the raw coverage of a path as it decreases from the first to the last pathway. 
In an ideal world, an interpretation of fsQCA results would be able to show precisely how 
each of the pathways accounts for a plausible configuration of conditions. In the present case, 
we can provide some explanations of the configurations; however, as a caveat, we also need 
 
                                                 
82 The cases with more than 0.5 membership are, referring to the five directives in a chronological order (see 
Table 2, above): for pathway (1): Romania 1,2,4,5; Netherlands 1,3,4,5; Ireland 1,3,4,5; Belgium 1,5; Germany 
1,5; France 1; for pathway (2): Germany 2,3,4,5, UK 2,3,4, Netherlands 1,4, Belgium 1; for pathway (3): UK 
1,3,5, Germany 1,3, France 5, Romania 4; for pathway (4) Romania 1,2,3,4,5, Ireland 2, Germany 1; for path-
way (5): Netherlands 3,5, Germany 3, UK 3, France 3; for pathway (6): France 2.  
The cases with more than 0.7 membership have been underlined in bold just above. 
83 Accounting for causal complexity is one of the advantages of (fs)QCA, see Misangyi at al, above n 68. 
84 The consistencies for the necessity of the conditions are: EU convergence: 0.5; No existing legislation: 0.76; 
Good legal system: 0.7; Public support for EU: 0.75; Effective government: 0.77; Left-wing government: 0.66; 
No interruption by elections: 0.54. 
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to note that it is not possible to present perfect narratives that would rationalise all of the con-
ditions and pathways (nor can we exclude that, for particular cases, idiosyncratic conditions 
may not also play a role85). 
To start with, it is noticeable that EU convergence is often relevant but only in combination 
with other factors, which confirms as the non-empirical finding by Baghi, emphasising how 
the harmonisation debate must be equally viewed in the light of the social and political as-
pects of the legal systems which are desired to be converged.86 On the basis of the factors an-
alysed in this study, it can be said that the favourable attitude of an EU Directive towards 
convergence is mediated through the domestic level. In particular, it can be seen that in two 
of the three pathways EU convergence is relevant in combination with ‘no existing legisla-
tion’. This configuration is plausible, namely that lack of prior domestic legislation followed 
by a favourable EU directive (ie: a directive with a high score for European convergence) 
leads to a high level of national convergence.  
For the two other groups of conditions, the general picture is that ‘national politics’ features 
more often than ‘country characteristics’, notably also with two of the conditions in the par-
simonious solution. The role of national politics is rarely explored in consumer protection 
literature:87 thus, this is an important finding, pointing to the need to ‘bring in politics’ in the 
debate about convergence and consumer sales law. The fact that country characteristics are 
less relevant can be interpreted in a progressive way, namely that countries are not somehow 
impaired by circumstances such as performing poorly in indicators of ‘good law’ or low pub-
lic support for the EU when it comes to the capacity to implement full legal convergence.  
Considering the typical cases, ie those with more than 0.5 membership, or even more than 0.7 
membership,88 the analysis of the pathways can be explained as follows. The first pathway 
includes the largest number of cases, notably four of the respective Romanian, Dutch, Bel-
gian and Irish cases. The two conditions of a favourable attitude of the respective EU di-
rective and public support for the EU complement each other well. It may then also be plau-
 
                                                 
85 See also the Conclusion, below. 
86 A Bagchi, ‘The Political Morality of Convergence in Contract’ (2018) 24 European Law Journal 36.  
87 For instance, see Tenreiro’s article on the challenging negotiations around the Unfair Contract Terms Di-
rective from a perspective of how certain Member States influenced negotiations: M Tenreiro, ‘The Community 
Directive on Unfair Terms and National Legal Systems – The Principle of Good Faith and Remedies for Unfair 
Terms’ (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law 273. For research considering the role of national politics see 
Section 2 (c), above. 
88 See n 82, above.          
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sible that the main countries of this pathway are four of the relatively less populous Member 
States as here there may be greater willingness to respond to such conditions than, say, in 
France, Germany and the UK. All four cases with more than 0.7 membership included in the 
first pathway are linked to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the only maximum 
harmonisation directive in the study.  
By contrast, the cases of both the second and the third pathway are predominantly from Ger-
many and the UK. Both share the condition of an effective government, which can also be 
explained in terms of trust in public institutions. In the second pathway, this is combined with 
the condition of a good legal system and in the third pathway it is combined with the condi-
tions of EU convergence and no existing legislation. It can therefore be said that both coun-
tries show more complex configurations when it comes to the determinants for high national 
convergence, with the second pathway being somehow more generic and the third pathway 
linked to the gap a new directive may be able to fill. 
The fourth pathway applies to all of the Romanian cases. This is likely to be due to the fact 
that Romania transposed all directives around the same time, given that all these instruments 
pre-date Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007. In substance, the conditions can be seen as 
typical for one of the EU accession countries: there is no experience with EU legislation, no 
existing legislation on matters covered by EU directives and public support for the EU is high 
because of the low level of trust in national institutions, and high level of trust in suprana-
tional institutions, combined with no disruption of the law making process by new elections. 
The conditions of the fifth and sixth pathways are the most complex ones (and they do not 
show any cases with more than 0.7 membership), with the former being mainly about EU 
convergence and country characteristics and the latter being mainly about national politics. 
As the sixth pathway only includes one case, it is more interesting to consider the fifth path-
way more closely. Here, it is noteworthy that four of the five cases concern the Distance Sell-
ing Directive. The relevant conditions show that there has been a gap in the respective Mem-
ber States filled by a favourable EU Directive and supported by left wing politicians in gov-
ernment, arguably since the latter are keen to restrict the power of large multi-national corpo-
rations engaged in distance selling.  
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(d) Result and discussion for low national convergence 
The fsQCA results discussed in the following reverse the question, namely it is asked which 
pathways lead to particularly low levels of national convergence. Here too we also estab-
lished that none of the conditions is alone necessary for the outcome.89 
Table 6: Determinants for low national convergence (‘intermediate solution’ with results al-
so in ‘parsimonious solution’ in large signs)90 
 Pathways
1 2 3
EU convergence
Country characteristics
No existing legislation
Good legal system
Public support for EU
National politics
Effective government
Left-wing government
No interruption by elections
Consistency 0.84 0.76 0.59
Raw Coverage 0.53 0.45 0.36
Unique Coverage 0.15 0.05 0.03
Cases with >0.5 membership 8 8 5
Overall Solution Consistency  0.63 (intermediate), 0.50 (parsimonious)
Overall Solution Coverage  0.70 (intermediate), 0.75 (parsimonious)  
 
In Table 6, EU convergence is not relevant in any of the pathways. This is an interesting find-
ing as it shows that it is mainly domestic factors, not the EU approach, that lead to low levels 
of legal convergence. The condition most relevant – and which is also present in the parsimo-
nious solution – is that there is an interruption by elections (to be precise, not ‘no interruption 
by elections’). This is plausible as such an interruption may negatively affect both the timeli-
ness and the substance of an implementation of EU law. 
 
                                                 
89 The consistencies for the necessity of the conditions are here: EU convergence: 0.64; No existing legislation: 
0.47; Good legal system: 0.68; Public support for EU: 0.66; Effective government: 0.75; Left-wing government: 
0.80; No interruption by elections: 0.74.  
90 The cases with more than 0.5 membership are, referring to the five directives in a chronological order (see 
Table 2, above): for pathway (1): Netherlands 2,3,5, Ireland 1,3, Belgium 4,5, France 3; for pathway (2): France 
3,4,5, UK 1,4, Germany 2,3, Belgium 4; for pathway (3): Germany 2,5, France 1, Ireland 1, Netherlands 1.  
The cases with more than 0.7 membership have been underlined in bold just above. 
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Considering the typical cases, ie those with more than 0.5 or even 0.7 membership,91 the 
analysis of the three pathways can be explained as follows: in the first pathway are three cas-
es from the Netherlands, two from Belgium and two from Ireland. These are countries with 
often complex coalition governments; thus, it is plausible that here we have situations where 
both the lack of an effective government and interruption by election lead to low levels of 
national convergence.  
The second pathway refers to situations where, in addition to the interruption by elections, 
low support for the EU has had a negative impact on national convergence. This includes, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, two cases from the UK – which are also the ones that even have 0.7 
membership – but also three from France, two from Germany and one from Belgium. Those 
latter cases are primarily about the more recent directives; thus, they may reflect the rise of 
Eurosceptic populism across the EU, notably in France with the Front National, which also 
impacts on the mainstream political parties. By contrast, the third pathway mainly concerns 
the convergence as regards the two older directives; thus, this may reflect that the ‘interfer-
ence’ of EU law into existing prior legislation was felt to be more severe than in later years. 
CONCLUSION 
The body of European consumer law is ever-growing. As the European legislator continues 
its endeavours of harmonising national standards,92 questions about the overall impact of this 
policy must be raised. In particular, the effects of convergence need to be explored from dif-
ferent perspectives as their assumed success is at the centre of the entire body of consumer 
policy proposed by the European Commission. This article contributed to this debate by way 
of using a new Convergence Index and the method of a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA), which had yet to be applied to European consumer sales law.  
It is one of the features of QCA that it fills the gap between low-number case studies and 
large quantitative data analyses. In our case, we had 35 observations, which is a typical num-
ber of cases for QCA. The advantage of not having more cases is that its tools leave more 
freedom to the researcher to make sense of the dataset and the outcomes of the analysis. It 
 
                                                 
91 See n 90, above. 
92 The most recent initiative is the Commission’s ‘A New Deal for Consumers package’ of 11 April 2018, see 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3041_en.htm. 
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also means that the results can be analysed in a more nuanced way than in a ‘black-box-style’ 
large-scale statistical analysis.  
A corresponding limitation is, however, that we do not claim that our results offer a universal 
finding that may also hold, for example, for other Member States and for other areas of Euro-
pean harmonisation. The relatively small number of observations also means that it is neces-
sary to be selective in the choice of explanatory factors:93  thus, this article could only include 
seven possible determinants; a necessary caveat is therefore that further determinants may 
play a role for particular countries and directives.94 
The question this article aimed to explore was about the determinants for national conver-
gence of EU consumer sales law. The scores for national convergence were based on a 
unique coding of five directives in seven Member States. As possible explanatory factors, we 
considered seven conditions: the one on EU convergence, coded for each of the five direc-
tives, and two groups of three conditions on ‘country characteristics’ and ‘national politics’.95 
The main findings can be summarised as follows: EU convergence is often relevant but only 
in combination with other factors. In other words, the harmonising policies envisioned by the 
European legislator have a limited effect in so far as they do not account for national features 
of Member States, and a favourable attitude of an EU Directive towards convergence is me-
diated through the domestic level. With respect to the two other groups of conditions, the 
general picture is that ‘national politics’ matters more than ‘country characteristics’. In the 
former group of conditions, it is in particular the condition on ‘effective government’ ac-
counts for high levels of national convergence. When we examine why countries have partic-
ularly low levels of convergence, we find that ‘no interruption by elections’ is the most rele-
vant condition. 
These findings have important policy implications. They show, first, that it matters how far 
an EU directive is favourable towards convergence. Second, the fact that country characteris-
tics are less relevant than national politics means that countries are not somehow impaired by 
 
                                                 
93 For the choice of possible determinants in this article see Section 2 (c), above.  
94 For example, there could be national political dynamics in particular sectors, such as the influence of lobby-
ing; for such cases see eg Duncan, above n 35; JW Cioffi and M Höpner ‘The Political Paradox of Finance 
Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform’ (2006) 34 
Politics & Society 463. 
95 Future research could examine these groups of variables as nested within clusters, analogous to a form of 
multlilevel item response theory model. 
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certain country characteristics when it comes to the capacity to implement full legal conver-
gence. Third, the strong showing of national politics is the most important finding of this arti-
cle. The role of national politics is rarely explored in the consumer protection literature:96 
thus, we suggest that there is the need to ‘bring in politics’ in the debate about convergence 
and consumer sales law and further explore the impact of politics on this field of law with 
mixed methodologies and perspectives.  
 
                                                 
96 For the previous literature see the references in Section 2 (b) and (c), above. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Descriptive statistics (all: n = 35; min. = 0; max. = 1): 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
National convergence 0.624 0.61 0.218 
EU convergence 0.602 0.67 0.332 
No existing legislation 0.671 1 0.382 
Good legal system 0.555 0.54 0.291 
Public support for EU 0.592 0.75 0.300 
Effective government 0.576 0.55 0.221 
Left-wing government 0.487 0.53 0.281 
No interruption by elections 0.429 0 0.502 
 
Correlation of conditions: 
 
Na-
tional 
con-
ver-
gence 
EU 
con-
ver-
gence 
No 
exist-
ing 
legisla-
tion 
Good 
legal 
system 
Public 
sup-
port 
for EU 
Effec-
tive 
gov-
ern-
ment 
Left-
wing 
gov-
ern-
ment 
No 
inter-
ruption 
by 
elec-
tions 
National 
convergence 1 -0.003 0.096 -0.219 -0.092 0.019 0.140 0.644 
EU conver-
gence -0.003 1 0.170 -0.183 -0.079 0.106 0.031 -0.237 
No existing 
legislation 0.096 0.170 1 -0.146 -0.039 -0.228 0.027 0.219 
Good legal 
system -0.219 -0.183 -0.146 1 -0.130 0.103 0.039 -0.368 
Public sup-
port for EU -0.092 -0.079 -0.039 -0.130 1 -0.642 -0.100 -0.088 
Effective 
government 0.019 0.106 -0.228 0.103 -0.642 1 -0.073 -0.004 
Left-wing 
government 0.140 0.031 0.027 0.039 -0.100 -0.073 1 0.203 
No interrup-
tion by elec-
tions 0.644 -0.237 0.219 -0.368 -0.088 -0.004 0.203 1 
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Appendix 2: Truth tables 
Truth table for high national convergence: 
EU 
con-
ver-
gence 
No 
exist-
ing 
legis-
lation 
Good 
legal 
sys-
tem 
Public 
sup-
port 
for EU 
Effec-
tive 
gov-
ern-
ment 
Left-
wing 
gov-
ern-
ment 
No 
inter-
rup-
tion 
by 
elec-
tions 
Out
com
e 
Con-
sisten-
cy  Cases 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 Romania 1,3,5 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 Romania 2 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 Germany 1 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 Ireland 2 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 UK 5 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 UK 3 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 France 2 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 Romania 4 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.97 Germany 5 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.97 France 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.95 Ireland 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.95 Ireland 3 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.94 Germany 3 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.94 France 3 
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.90 UK1, France 5 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.90 Belgium 5 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.90 Netherlands 1 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.88 Germany 2 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.87 Netherlands 3,5 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.79 Netherlands 2 
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Truth table for low national convergence: 
EU 
con-
ver-
gence 
No 
exist-
ing 
legis-
lation 
Good 
legal 
sys-
tem 
Public 
sup-
port 
for EU 
Effec-
tive 
gov-
ern-
ment 
Left-
wing 
gov-
ern-
ment 
No 
inter-
rup-
tion 
by 
elec-
tions 
Out
com
e 
Con-
sisten-
cy  Cases 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 France 3 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 Germany 2 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.95 Belgium 5 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.93 Netherlands 3,5 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.91 Netherlands 2 
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.90 UK 1, France 5 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.89 France 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.88 Netherlands 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.88 Germany 3 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.85 Germany 5 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.83 Ireland 3 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.82 Ireland 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.77 France 1 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.71 UK 5 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.71 Romania 2 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.65 Germany 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.64 Romania 1,3,5 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.63 Romania 4 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.58 Ireland 2 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.52 UK 3 
 
Note: The cases refer to the countries and the five directives on (1) Doorstep Selling, (2) Unfair Con-
tract Terms, (3) Distance Selling, (4) Consumer Sales and (5) Unfair Commercial Practices. 
 
